9th Circuit

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To foster open and honest communications with counsel, it is critically important that those communications are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.  But, not every communication with counsel is privileged, and knowing when a communication with counsel is protected can sometimes prove difficult.  Given an increasingly complex regulatory landscape, more and more attorneys—particularly in-house attorneys—are wearing dual hats as both lawyers and business advisors.  As a lawyer, communications  may be privileged; but if acting as a business advisor, communications may be subject to disclosure.

Since the corporate setting doesn’t lend itself to bifurcating legal and business communications, what happens when the lines are blurred or when a communication serves both purposes?

The “Primary Purpose” Test

Many courts, like the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, require that for a communication to be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the “primary purpose” of the communication must be to give or receive legal advice. Attorney-client privilege does not apply to business, commercial, or tax advice.  Under this method of analysis, courts look to the content of a communication to determine its predominant or primary purpose.Continue Reading Reminder: When Are Communications with Corporate Counsel Privileged?

The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently released its report detailing the settlements and judgments obtained in 2019 from civil cases involving fraud and abuse claims.  As in years past, the substantial majority of these settlements and judgments—$2.1 billion of the $3 billion total—were the result of qui tam whistleblower lawsuits filed under the False Claims Act (FCA).

Following the government’s intervention decision, the first test for many of these qui tam lawsuits is surviving a motion to dismiss.  Because FCA suits allege fraud against the government, they must be pleaded with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This post discusses recent developments to those standards from 2019.

Courts have held that to satisfy Rule 9(b), FCA complaints must include a detailed description of the alleged fraud scheme and facts to show the scheme resulted in a request for reimbursement from the government.  A failure on either account will result in dismissal.Continue Reading Recent Developments in False Claims Act Pleading Standards

This is the second post of a two-part discussion of FCA pleading standards and discusses the pleading requirements for connecting a fraudulent scheme to the submission of false claims.  Read our previous post on the requirements for pleading the details of a fraudulent scheme.

Pleading Submission of False Claims

Most courts require FCA plaintiffs to round out their FCA pleadings with allegations that false claims were submitted to the government as a result of the alleged fraud scheme.  Some courts require plaintiffs to identify specific representative examples, while others permit the pleading of “reliable indicia” leading to a “strong inference” that claims were actually submitted.

Pleading Actual Claims  

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently laid out the level of detail generally expected for pleading the submission of actual false claims.  In U.S. ex rel. Wollman v. General Hospital Corporation, it held the relator made insufficient allegations of actual claims submitted as part of a fraudulent billing scheme involving overlapping surgeries when the complaint included “no dates, identification numbers, amounts, services, individuals involved, or length of time” for any of the surgeries at issue.Continue Reading Recent Developments in FCA Pleading Standards – Part Two

This is the first post of a two-part discussion of FCA pleading standards and discusses the requirements for pleading the details of a fraudulent scheme. Read our post on the pleading requirements for connecting a fraudulent scheme to the submission of false claims.

The False Claims Act (FCA) continues to be the federal government’s primary civil enforcement tool for imposing liability on healthcare providers who defraud federal healthcare programs.  A significant portion of FCA litigation is initiated through the filing of sealed qui tam complaints by relators on behalf of the United States.  When these complaints are unsealed, whether the government intervenes or not, their first hurdle is often surviving a motion to dismiss.  Because actions under the FCA allege fraud against the government, courts require allegations sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Determining whether an FCA complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) turns on two related questions: Does it contain an adequate description of the alleged fraud scheme? If so, does it connect that scheme to false claims submitted to the government?

This post discusses the requirements for adequately pleading a fraudulent scheme.  We have also written a follow-up post discussing the requirements for connecting that scheme to the submission of actual false claims.  To follow our discussion of recent developments in FCA pleading standards, subscribe to this blog.

Pleading Details of a Fraudulent Scheme

Generally speaking, courts agree that in order to pass muster, FCA complaints must include all of the details one would expect to find in the first paragraph of a newspaper article—that is, the “who, what, when, where and how” of the alleged fraud.  While meeting this standard may seem simple enough, courts continue to grapple with the nuances and difficulties associated with pleading fraud with the requisite specificity.Continue Reading Recent Developments in FCA Pleading Standards – Part One

In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar confirming the viability of the implied false certification theory in False Claims Act (FCA) cases and mandating that claims brought pursuant to that theory satisfy “demanding” materiality and scienter requirements.  As discussed in a prior post, since Escobar, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have wrestled with analyzing and applying the materiality and scienter requirements discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion, resulting in a number of recent petitions for writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court seeking clarification of the Escobar mandates.

In one of its first actions of 2019, the Supreme Court recently denied petitions in two closely-watched FCA cases, U.S. ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Industries, Inc., and Gilead Sciences Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Campie.

$660 Million Reversal Stands in Harman

The plaintiff-relator in Harman sought review from the Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a $660 million jury verdict, holding that the relator failed to prove that the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations were material to government’s payment decisions.  The relator in Harman claimed that the defendant produced and sold defective highway guardrails to various states, causing them to submit fraudulent claims for reimbursement to the federal government.  However, evidence was presented that the Federal Highway Administration was aware of the alleged defects but continued to pay for the guardrails despite their non-compliance.  Relying on Escobar, the Fifth Circuit held that relator failed to overcome such “strong evidence” that the requirements at issue were not material.   The Supreme Court’s recent denial of the relator’s petition leaves intact the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and precedential opinion, providing a potential defense to FCA defendants in cases where the government was aware of certain conduct but continued to pay claims.Continue Reading With Widening Circuit Splits and Mounting Pressure, Will 2019 See a Post-Escobar Decision from the Supreme Court?

On August 24, 2018, the Ninth Circuit addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, holding that Escobar sets forth the exclusive test for establishing FCA liability under the theory of implied false certification.  In that case, U.S. ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute, the Ninth Circuit also grappled with Escobar’s materiality requirement, providing further guidance on how the past government action factor of the materiality analysis should be applied.
Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Holds that Escobar Set Forth Exclusive Conditions for Implied Certification Liability

The Ninth Circuit recently revived a False Claims Act (FCA) suit against Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) related to risk adjustment payments for Medicare Advantage plans in U.S. ex rel. Silingo v. WellPoint Inc. et al.  As previously discussed in this blog post, MAOs provide Medicare benefits under a capitated payment system, whereby government reimbursement is based on an individual’s risk adjustment data.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) increase monthly payments to MAOs when an individual’s medical diagnoses support a higher level of risk or cost of care.  Recently, both relators and the government in a number of cases have challenged the validity of diagnostic patient information utilized to support risk adjustment data, as discussed here and here.
Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Reaffirms Group Pleading Standard in FCA Cases

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a relator who pleaded guilty to a felony that involved the same fraudulent conduct that gave rise to the relator’s qui tam suit in U.S. ex rel. Schroeder v. CH2M Hill. The FCA’s § 3730(d)(3) requires dismissal of a relator from a qui tam lawsuit and precludes the relator from any recovery in the lawsuit, “[i]f the relator has been convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or her role in the violation of section 3729.” In Schroeder, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this provision applied even to minor participants in the underlying alleged misconduct, who neither planned nor initiated the fraudulent scheme.

The relator, who was employed by the defendant government contractor, was involved in an underlying fraudulent scheme to bill the Department of Energy (DOE) by submitting false time cards to DOE for hourly work. After his interview by investigators, the relator pleaded guilty to a felony count of conspiracy to commit fraud. After his interview, but before pleading guilty, the relator filed suit under the FCA against his employer concerning the DOE fraud scheme. The United States intervened and moved to dismiss the relator from the lawsuit under § 3730(d)(3) as a result of his felony conviction.Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Takes Hard Line against Relators Involved in FCA Wrongdoing

Employee severance packages and settlement agreements often include a broad waiver of any claims, known or an unknown, which an employee may have against the company.  Although such broad pre-filing releases are highly recommended, companies doing business with the government should be cautioned that these waivers do not always protect against False Claims Act (FCA) litigation.  A line of federal cases has established that these so-called “pre-filing releases” are sometimes unenforceable against suits filed by whistleblowers, or qui tam actions, for public policy reasons.
Continue Reading Enforceability of Employee Releases on Qui Tam Actions

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From the Bass, Berry & Sims Blog Network

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