Statute of Limitations

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt regarding how the False Claims Act’s (FCA) statute of limitations applies in qui tam actions brought by a private relator in which the government declined to intervene. The Court heard lively arguments regarding a statute that has undoubtedly confused many. After oral argument, the Court appears poised to conclude that relators may appropriately take advantage of a longer limitations period.

FCA Statute of Limitations Raises Questions Regarding How and When It Should be Tolled

The FCA’s statute of limitations provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), states that a civil action may not be brought under the FCA:

  1. more than six years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
  2. more than three years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, whichever occurs last.

Continue Reading Supreme Court Wrestles with “Terribly Drafted” FCA Statute of Limitations

On November 16, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Hunt, agreeing to decide how the FCA’s statute of limitations applies in qui tam actions brought by a private relator in which the government declined to intervene. The Court’s decision in Hunt should bring sorely needed clarity to a question that has deeply divided the federal courts of appeals.

The Supreme Court Will Review the Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)

The FCA’s statute of limitations provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), states that a civil action may not be brought under the FCA:

  • more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
  • more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,

whichever occurs last.

The specific question presented in Hunt is whether § 3731(b)(2), which operates as a tolling provision to the six-year limitations period of § 3731(b)(1), applies to FCA actions brought by a relator in which the government declined to intervene, and if so, whether the government’s knowledge or the relator’s knowledge is the relevant trigger for the limitations period.Continue Reading Supreme Court Agrees to Resolve Circuit Split on FCA Statute of Limitations

In a long-awaited ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Wartime Suspension Limitations Act (WSLA) does not toll the statute of limitations in civil FCA actions, as the WSLA applies only to criminal actions.  After lying dormant for more than 40 years, the WSLA had threatened to upend the FCA’s limitations period and expose defendants to open-ended and extensive liability for otherwise stale FCA claims.

Amended in 2008, the WSLA provides that the statute of limitations applicable to any offense involving fraud against the United States during a time of war or when Congress has enacted a specific authorization for the use of military force is suspended until five years after the termination of hostilities.  In a number of recent cases, relators had begun relying on the WSLA as a means to avoid dismissal of claims brought outside of the FCA’s limitations period.Continue Reading Supreme Court Limits WSLA to Criminal Offenses